01-06-2015

doi:10.7910/DVN/28582

Concern that donations to political campaigns can help political actors secure preferential treatment from policymakers has long occupied judges, scholars, and the public. However, the effects of contributions on policymakers’ behavior are notoriously difficult to assess. We present the first randomized field experiment on the topic. The experiment focuses on whether contributions facilitate access to influential policymakers. In the experiment, a political organization attempted to schedule meetings between 191 Congressional offices and the organization’s members in their districts who were campaign donors. However, the organization randomly assigned whether it revealed to Congressional offices that prospective attendees had contributed to campaigns. When informed prospective attendees were political donors, senior policymakers made themselves available between three and four times more often. These findings underscore concerns about the Supreme Court’s recent decisions deregulating campaign finance.

Kalla, Joshua; Broockman, David, 2015, "Campaign Contributions Facilitate Access to Congressional Officials: A Randomized Field Experiment", http://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/28582, Harvard Dataverse, V1

Kalla, Joshua

Broockman, David

Harvard University

SCR:011273

DataVerse

Dataverse Network Project

SCR:001997