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Title: Replication data for: Pursuit of interest: The politics of subsidized trade in the Soviet bloc, 1993      
dateReleased:
01-30-2012
downloadURL: http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/EMWZSZZDJM
ID:
hdl:1902.1/EMWZSZZDJM
description:
The failure of the Soviet policy of economic integration with Eastern Europe is explained in terms of (1) the economic incentives facing the countries; and (2) the incoherence of Soviet institutions. In contrast to many economists who study the CMEA, I argue that distributional politics played an important role in the failure of integration: successive initiatives fell victim to the countries' maneuvers to maximize their gains from distortional CMEA prices. In contrast to political scientists of the realist school, I argue that the Soviet trade subsidy could not be employed as a deliberate policy tool, because the Soviet bureaucracy was constitutionally unable to maintain a consistent policy over time. Soviet policy responded to the incentives facing individual Soviet officials, who were rewar ded and punished in terms of imprecise measures of performance, and who had limited job security. I test four theories: "liberal," "realist," "subsidized-trade," and "institutional." Each generates propositions about interests, tactics and outcomes, and the dissertation tests them in a variety of contexts. Chapter 2 uses statistical analysis to refute previous findings that had supported the realist contention that the subsidy was used to punish and reward the satellites. Chapter 3 examines three cases of conflict in the bloc (Czechoslovakia in 1968, Hungary in the 1970s and earl y 1980s, and Poland in 1981), arguing that the Soviet subsidy was not used to threaten, punish or reward. Chapter 4 examines bilateral trade negotiations, finding clues to the countries' interests and capabilities in their bargaining tactics. Chapters 5 through 8 cover four case studies of major Soviet integration initiatives: the Comprehensive Program (1971), Long-Term Target Programs (1978-79), Comprehensive Program for Scientific and Technical Progress (1985) and the Unified Socialist Market (1987-89). In each case, the East European countries maneuvered to maximize their shares of the trade subsidy, and in so doing, crippled the program. In each case, the Soviet bureaucracy failed to defend the Soviet national interest. These conclusions are based upon interviews and archival research conducted in Russia, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary.
description:
Randall Warren Stone, 2008, "Replication data for: Pursuit of interest: The politics of subsidized trade in the Soviet bloc, 1993", http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/EMWZSZZDJM, Harvard Dataverse, V3
name:
Randall Warren Stone
homePage: http://www.harvard.edu/
name:
Harvard University
ID:
SCR:011273
abbreviation:
DataVerse
homePage: http://thedata.org/
name:
Dataverse Network Project
ID:
SCR:001997